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Abstract
Most research on non‐competes has focused on employees; here we study how
non‐competes affect firm location choice, growth, and consequent regional
concentration, using Florida's 1996 legislative change that eased restrictions on
their enforcement. Difference‐in‐differences models show that following the
change, establishments of large firms were more likely to enter Florida; they
also created a greater proportion of jobs and increased their share of em-
ployment in the state. Entrepreneurs or establishments of small firms, in
contrast, were less likely to enter Florida following the law change; they also
created a smaller proportion of new jobs and decreased their share of em-
ployment. Consistent with these location and job creation dynamics, regional
business concentration increased following the law change in Florida.
Nationwide cross‐sections demonstrate consistent correlations between
state‐level non‐compete enforcement and the location, employment, and
concentration dynamics illustrated in Florida.
KEYWORD S
business concentration, business dynamism, employee mobility, entrepreneurship, firm sorting,
non‐compete agreement
J E L C LA S S I F I CA T I ON
J61; L22; L26; M13; M51
1 | INTRODUCTION
Most research on non‐competes to date has focused on how such laws impact employees (Garmaise, 2009; Marx,
Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009, Starr, 2019), patenting (Conti, 2014), and entrepreneurship (Samila & Sorenson, 2011;
Starr, Balasubramanian, & Sakakibara, 2017). Less research has considered how non‐competes impact firms’ decisions,
how those decisions might vary by the type of firm, and the ultimate impact of those decisions on industries and
regions. Here we document how one state's change in non‐compete laws influenced firms’ strategic choices and
preceded change in the competitive dynamics and industry concentration in that state.
Recent work has documented trends of increasing industry concentration, possibly due to scale and network effects
(Shambaugh, Nunn, Breitwieser, & Liu, 2018), deregulation (De Loecker, Eeckhout, & Unger, 2018), or efficiencies of
scale, mergers and acquisitions, innovation, or regulatory barriers (Council of Economic Advisors, 2016). Other work
has documented a broad decline in business dynamism across many sectors in the United States, including a flat trend
in firm exit and declining trends in firm entry and job reallocation (Hathaway & Litan, 2014) and a decrease in
entrepreneurship (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2013). Hathaway and Litan (2014) comment that, “Whatever the
reason, older and larger businesses are doing relatively better to younger and smaller ones.” A White House (2016)
policy brief documents a decline in competition, new firm formation, and business dynamism—and associates these
trends with state level non‐compete laws that typically decrease workers’ mobility. Scatter plots at the state level,
illustrated in Figure 1, also reveal positive relationships between enforcement of non‐competes and the share of large
firms, job creation by large firms, and regional business concentration. Such plots, however, are static and bivariate,
surely mask omitted variable bias, and like other work that has only documented the trends, “…remain[ed] silent on the
causes.” (De Loecker et al., 2018, p. 32)
To investigate one dynamic that could give rise to increased business concentration, we identify a clear change in
one state's non‐compete laws, a subsequent change in establishment entry and employment by firm size, and a
consistent effect on business concentration. We begin by documenting recent changes in non‐compete laws across all
U.S. states and establish that Florida's 1996 non‐compete law provides an unambiguous step change that strengthened
enforcement. Other states have also changed their non‐compete laws, though not as cleanly for the purposes of isolating
the impact of non‐competes on business concentration. For example, Michigan's 1985 change—the Michigan Anti‐trust
Reform Act—was explicitly intended to increase competitiveness; the legislators and analysts had no intent to change
non‐compete law (Marx et al., 2009). Florida's experience appears internally consistent and provides an example of a
plausible pathway from non‐compete enforcement to business concentration. We discuss and illustrate possible me-
chanisms, but hesitate to claim wide applicability and external validity, due to the difficulty of generalizing across the
many idiosyncrasies that accompany each state's change in non‐compete laws, and the many potential influences on
business concentration.
Florida's sharp legislative change in non‐compete enforcement illustrates how non‐compete laws can alter business
dynamism and the regional size distribution of firms. The law change appears to have favored establishments of larger
firms, and such firms created more new jobs. Stronger enforcement did not increase the establishment of start‐ups, the
arrival of small firms to the state, and job creation by such firms. Consistent with these trends, we find a significant
increase in business concentration measures following Florida's strengthening of non‐competes. These results are
robust to analyzing adjacent counties on Florida's borders, synthetic matching, industry matching, and placebo tests,
and are consistent with a nationwide cross section of states’ non‐compete enforcement and shares of establishment
entry, employment growth, and business concentration.
2 | EMPLOYEE NON ‐COMPETES
If you are a chief executive of a large company, you very likely have a non‐compete clause in your contract,
preventing you from jumping ship to a competitor until some period has elapsed. Likewise if you are a top
engineer or product designer, holding your company's most valuable intellectual property between your ears.
And you also probably have a non‐compete agreement if you assemble sandwiches at Jimmy John's sub
sandwich chain for a living (Irwin 2014).
Covenants not to compete (“non‐competes”) are agreements in which an employee agrees not to work for the
current employer's direct competitors in a specified area for a certain amount of time. They are becoming increasingly
prevalent in many industries besides high technology (Starr, 2019); 351 of 500 U.S. firms (70.2%) reported non‐compete
agreements for their top executives (Garmaise, 2009).1 Amazon requires their employees, including part‐time laborers,
to sign non‐competes, under which they will not work at “any company where they directly or indirectly support any
good or service that competes with those they helped support at Amazon (Woodman, 2015).”2 Physicians, dentists,
accountants, and even lawyers can be subject to non‐competes (Tanick & Trobaugh, 2012).
Non‐competes have developed in part because employers typically prefer labor contracts that aid in the retention of
desirable employees. Such contracts intend to mitigate the market failure of under‐investment in employee training and
research activities (Samila & Sorenson, 2011). With non‐competes in place, employers can invest in their employees and
provide confidential yet necessary information with less fear of information leakage or potential competition. Employees,
likewise, can credibly commit that they will not use the training and information for the benefit of a competitors.
Empirical work has established a variety of relationships with non‐compete enforcement, though little has focused
on how non‐competes affect existing firms. Stuart and Sorenson (2003) established that greater entrepreneurship
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followed IPOs in regions that lacked enforcement. Garmaise (2009) found that stronger enforcement correlated with
executive stability and reduced executive compensation. The Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA) in 1985 has been
used with difference‐in‐differences models to demonstrate decreased intra‐state mobility of inventors (Marx
et al., 2009), career detours (Marx, 2011), and inter‐state brain drain of inventors (Marx, Singh, & Fleming, 2015). Using
an instrument based on university endowment returns, Samila and Sorenson (2011) found that the number of patents,
number of start‐ups, and rate of employment are more responsive to the supply of venture capital in states that restrict
the enforceability of non‐competes. Conti (2014) illustrated a correlation in breakthrough and failed inventions in states
that enforced non‐competes, arguably due to greater risk‐taking by firms that were less afraid of losing their technical
personnel. Starr et al. (2017) used matched employer‐employee data and found that non‐compete enforceability is
negatively correlated with formation of small (0–19 employees) within‐industry spinouts, but positively correlated with
the survival of such new spinouts. Balasubramanian, Chang, Sakakibara, Sivadasan, and Starr (2019) found that non‐
compete enforceability correlates with longer job spells in technology industries, without an increase in wages.
None of the work to date has considered how non‐competes might have different impacts on existing firms of
different sizes and in particular, their location decisions and rates of job creation, and ultimately, on the distribution of
firm sizes. Figure 1 introduced above suggests that stronger enforcement might lead to larger firms, greater employment
by larger firms, and higher business concentration. Before discussing potential mechanisms, we first establish why
Florida's 1996 law change best enables one investigation of the dynamics that might underlie these relationships.
2.1 | Use of the 1996 Florida change in non‐compete enforcement as a case study
Florida's 1996 strengthening of non‐compete enforcement offers an attractive case study, in contrast to law changes in
other states (see Supporting Information Appendix D for a list of states that have changed their non‐compete laws and a
discussion of their suitability and comparability to Florida). Florida provides a close to ideal site because (a) the
legislation focused purely on restrictive covenants, notably non‐competes, (b) it was clearly intended to strengthen
enforcement in the state, and (c) Florida had a four decade history with the laws governing non‐competes, such that
employers and employees were probably familiar with and accustomed to non‐competes.
Additional features of the amendment support its use as a quasi‐natural experiment. First, it explicitly stated and
thereby clarified which rule governed a contract and stipulated a clear break on July 1, 1996. Second, 1996 amendments
to earlier statutes (please see Table A1 in Appendix) illustrate significant strengthening of the employer's enforceability
of non‐compete covenants. The number of words almost tripled, from 455 in §542.33A to 1,211 in §542.33B, in the
direction of strengthening employers’ enforcement, and courts could no longer refuse non‐compete enforcement on the
grounds of employee economic hardship or public policy concerns. Third, legal commentary construed these changes as
favoring business, for example, the 1996 amendment “… has once again swung the pendulum representing the en-
forceability of noncompetition agreements more in favor of employers (FindLaw, 2008).”3
3 | THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF NON ‐COMPETES BY FIRM SIZE
Despite a growing literature on non‐competes, most of the work to date has focused on individuals and their ability to pursue
outside opportunities. Less work has investigated whether enforcement favors certain types of firms over others and, in
particular, how non‐competes might impact firm location and employment, which might in turn influence business
FIGURE 1 The U.S. state non‐competes enforceability and regional business concentration. (a) Share of establishments by firm size, (b)
share of employment by firm size, (c) Pseudo HHI. Blue solid line represents a fitted (bivariate) regression line with full sample: regressed
each outcomes on non‐compete enforceability, including an intercept. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. Results for
regressions: (a) left panel: coefficient, −0.0052; standard error, 0.0021; p value, .0162; right panel: coefficient, 0.0031; standard error, 0.0016;
p value, .0570; (b) left panel: coefficient, −0.0120; standard error, 0.0041; p value .0057; right panel: coefficient, 0.0143; standard error,
0.0047; p value .0036; (c) coefficient, 1.233; standard error, 0.4289; p value, .0060. Small firms: <50 employees. Large firms: >1,000
employees. To construct the index of non‐compete enforceability, Garmaise (2009) examined 12 questions on the state‐level enforceability of
non‐competes surveyed by Malsberger (2004). Garmaise assigned one point to each question if the state's enforcement of that dimension of
non‐competes exceeded a given threshold. The index ranges from 0 to 12. Data: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1996. [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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concentration, if there were different effects on small versus large firms. We consider the differential effects of non‐competes by
firm size on location (at birth or in movement of extant establishments) and employment choice of firms and regional business
concentration. We discuss how the law change in Florida might cause a (a) shift in the distribution of businesses by firm
size, (b) shift in the sources of new job creation and employment by firm size, and (c) change in regional business
concentration. We discuss possible mechanisms, but present no formal theory, and explore the answer empirically.
3.1 | Non‐competes and location choice, for startups
The recruitment of high quality and experienced employees constitutes one of the greatest challenges in the founding
and scaling of a new business (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003). Entrepreneurial companies in particular need to hire already
capable and experienced workers because (a) they do not have the resources or time to invest in employee training, and
(b) compared to large incumbents, they are less likely to have a systematic training process for novice workers.
Startups might prefer locations with weak non‐compete laws, as they would ideally like to hire experienced
employees (who will be more experienced if they were recently working for a competitor). Hiring unemployed workers
remains unattractive because they are generally less experienced than active employees; furthermore, an unemployed
worker can still be bound by a non‐compete. Startups also may not value as highly the legal strategies enabled by non‐
competes. Since startups by construction cover narrower businesses and geographies, an employee departing a startup
will have a wider range of employment opportunities that do not include competitors. This wider range will make it
more likely that an employee can leave for a company that is not an obvious competitor and hence not covered by non‐
competes. Add to this the greater likelihood that a startup will lack the resources to pursue legal action against former
employees, and a startup would likely place lower value on location in a region with strong non‐compete enforcement.
Startups may also have reasons to prefer locations with strong non‐compete laws. Founders and their immediate
teams probably share more complete access to all information within the organization, due to the small size of the firm,
shared responsibilities, and probably weak and yet to be formalized information‐sharing protocols. Given that startups
often have no reputation and few complementary assets, their ideas and intellectual property are often their only
advantages, and they may be attracted to legal regimes where they can more easily keep an employee from departing,
particularly to a better‐resourced competitor. Foreseeing growth, startups might also prefer locations with strong non‐
compete laws, as such laws would help keep their current employees as they seek new employees (Starr et al., 2017).
Empirically, if startups find strong non‐competes attractive, we would expect to find an increase in the number of small
firms and their establishments, following a shift to the stronger non‐compete enforcement (and the opposite if startups
find non‐competes unattractive).
3.2 | Non‐competes and location choice, for existing firms
Existing firms, especially if they are not attempting to hire more than a small proportion of their extant workforce, are
more likely to prefer regions with stronger non‐compete enforcement, and hence more likely to move there or establish
additional franchises. When large firms do need to hire, and in contrast to the challenges faced by smaller firms, non‐
competes might also multiply the typically superior financial and legal resources of large firms. Such firms are more
able to buy out non‐compete provisions from new employees’ former employers. Potential legal costs also favor large
firms, which generally have more experience, financial resources, and economies of scale when utilizing legal services,
such as contracting advisory or litigation.
Similar to startups and small firms, the strategic importance of retaining existing employees is also likely to be very
important for larger firms. Bigger firms typically have systematic processes in place to train their workers (which is
costly) and have granted them access to strategic assets and information. If these workers move to (emerging) com-
petitors, large incumbents could lose their investment in their trained workforce; furthermore, mobile employees might
also unwillingly transfer important strategic assets of former employers, either implicitly or explicitly, to the competing
firms. Therefore, firms that are large and mature may feel that they gain more than they lose from immobilized
employees and thus may place a higher value on location in a region with strong non‐compete enforcement.
Regions with strong non‐compete enforcement may also attract larger firms because such firms can temporarily
allocate newly hired (or explicitly poached) employees to business units or subsidiaries that do not directly compete
with their former employer. Such firms can then reallocate employees to the most relevant units after their
KANG AND FLEMING | 5
non‐compete term expires. In other words, large firms are more likely diversified and thus run businesses in multiple
fields; these diversified business units can serve as “holding tanks” (Marx & Fleming, 2012) for new employees who
might be bound by non‐competes. Small firms, in contrast, are more likely to focus on a specific area and lack
diversified business units that could serve as legitimate holding tanks.
Analogous to “voting with feet (Tiebout, 1956),” firms might (re‐)locate their establishments to municipalities that offer a
preferred business environment, essentially shopping for advantageous policies. As described above, large firms might prefer
strong non‐compete regions and hence open new establishments in Florida or move extant establishments to Florida, following
the amendment. The advantages to entrepreneurial firms, on the other hand, remain mixed (and it is very possible that there is
no monotonic relationship between firm size and location preference—we leave it as an empirical question). Empirically, if
existing (and typically larger) firms find strong non‐competes relatively more attractive, we would expect to find an increase in
the number of large firms and their establishments, following a shift to stronger enforcement.
3.3 | Non‐competes and the challenges of hiring and job creation, for small firms
The enforceability of non‐competes may also differentially affect the creation of new jobs and employment, depending
on a company's size. All other things being equal (e.g., assuming that all firms want to hire and grow), if it becomes
easier (harder) for larger (smaller) firms to hire new workers, we would expect to observe a shift in the distribution of
sources of new jobs and employment by firm size, following the 1996 law change. Since we do not observe whether
individual firms attempt to grow or employee's preferences or responses to employment offers, we will consider how
non‐competes could make it more or less difficult for different types of firms—small versus large—to hire.
Regional mobility of workers decreases with stronger enforcement (Balasubramanian et al., 2019; Marx et al., 2009),
and this decrease may put startups and small firms at a greater disadvantage in hiring employees and creating new jobs.
If workers expect to be bound by a non‐compete, they may avoid opportunities at smaller and entrepreneurial firms.
When workers are unable to hop between jobs and find a better match, they are more likely to choose a large employer
that typically offers better benefits packages, job stability, internal job hopping, and other non‐pecuniary incentives.
This is more so when non‐competes remain in force after an employee is laid off; in this situation, workers who sign
non‐competes bear additional risks should the business go awry because they remain bound by commitment, and small
businesses and particularly startups are more likely to go awry.
Further adding to small firms’ challenges in creating jobs, they are typically less able to offer appealing and
competitive incentives to prospective employees. Small firms are generally riskier, pay less, and are focused on less
diverse businesses (thus affording fewer internal career transfers). Furthermore, they offer less protection from po-
tential non‐compete prosecution by larger firms with intimidating legal resources. This is in contrast to a location
without non‐competes, where (marginal) job seekers may be more likely to choose small firms that are riskier, because
they can leave the small firm and get another job more easily.
This argument, however, can also be turned on its head. Under strong non‐compete enforceability, potential
employees may prefer startups and small firms, if they anticipate that those firms will lack the resources or will to
pursue a departing employee and prosecute a non‐compete, relative to a larger firm. Furthermore, and consistent with
the argument above, a narrow startup probably has fewer market and geographical competitors, thus making it less
likely that a new employer would compete with the prior employer. If small firms had not yet developed firm‐specific
proprietary knowledge, they also might be less likely to prosecute a non‐compete, making them more attractive to
employees (and thus making it easier for the small firm to hire).
3.4 | Non‐competes and the challenges of hiring and job creation, for large firms
Larger firms should be less challenged in hiring and creating jobs in strong non‐compete locations, due in part to the
opposite arguments just made for startups and small firms (difficulty in attracting risk‐averse talent, inability to offer
competitive compensation, and weaker legal resources in non‐compete litigation). Large, established firms will prob-
ably find hiring (and training) new employees more attractive in strong non‐compete locales, because non‐competes
make it more likely they will retain their employee and recoup their investment.
Firms that benefit from non‐competes will also accrue additional resources that in turn enable future growth in
their work force. The greater enforceability of non‐competes reduces an employee's outside alternatives, that is under
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standard non‐competes, workers cannot be hired by a new employer that operates in the same field as their former
employer. This significantly decreases the possibility that a worker is pursued by other employers and thus weakens the
worker's negotiating power against his or her current employer (Starr, 2019). To the extent that the best alternative for
an employee becomes unavailable due to non‐competes, the current employer can appropriate this increased gap
between the expected value of the current job versus alternatives (Garmaise, 2009). This mechanism provides additional
advantage and resources to a current employer that can in turn be invested in the expansion of the firm's work force;
furthermore, firms with a larger stock of workers will benefit more from it.
3.5 | Regional business concentration
A demographic shift toward small or large firms and a proportional change in job creation and employment by either
group implies a restructuring of the local economy and change in business concentration, through entrepreneurship,
firm (re)location, and endogenous growth. We will not repeat the mechanisms detailed above, and here focus on the
impact of those mechanisms on regional business concentration.4
With regards the location of entrepreneurship, if startups are more attracted to a location due to a strengthening in
non‐compete enforcement, the density of small firms will increase. On the other hand, if larger (and assumedly
incumbent) firms are attracted, they will move to or open more establishments in the region, which will increase the
density of large firms there (at least on the margin). With regards job creation and employment growth, any differential
impact will be observable in the sources of jobs; if startups and small firms are advantaged, they will exhibit an increase
in job creation and employment, likewise, if large firms are advantaged, they will exhibit an increase. The mechanisms
need not be monotonic or asymmetric; if the market is restructured in a way that attracts large firms and crowds out
small firms, and large firm employment growth is favored, this should be observable in an overall increase in regional
business concentration.
4 | EMPIRICAL DESIGN
4.1 | Data and sample
We use the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau for our main analysis. This data
covers almost the universe of firms and their business units (“establishments”) in the U.S. It provides MSA‐Firm Size‐
Year level data on establishment (including count, entry, and exit), job creation, and employment; for each MSA‐year,
variables on establishments and their employment are provided for 12 firm size categories: 1–4, 5–9, 10–19, 20–49,
50–99, 100–249, 250–499, 500–999, 1,000–2,499, 2,500–4,999, 5,000–9,999 employees, and 10,000 or more employees.
One limitation is that the data are not available at the MSA‐Industry‐Firm Size‐Year level; in other words, we
cannot run industry‐specific analyses. To ameliorate this restriction, in Section 7.1, we use industry information from a
separate data source, the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), constructed from the unemployment
insurance (UI) accounting system for each state in the U.S. and provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We
pair MSAs in Florida and other comparison states based on their industry composition and calculate the distance in
industry composition as the squared sum of differences in employment share by 5‐digit NAICS industries. For each
MSA in Florida, we select and pair ten MSAs in comparison states that have the most similar industry composition (i.e.,
the lowest distance score). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and a correlation table. There is little evidence of high
correlations across variables.
4.2 | Difference‐in‐differences model
We mainly estimate difference‐in‐differences (DiD) models. The basic idea is that, as we do not observe MSAs in Florida
in the absence of the 1996 amendment, we use non‐Florida MSAs (which did not undergo any changes in the rules
governing non‐competes) as counterfactuals. In other words, we assume that MSAs in our treatment state (Florida) and
control states (non‐Florida) would exhibit the same trends in outcome variables, in the absence of treatment. To better
facilitate this “parallel trend,” we exclude MSAs in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Texas, and Puerto Rico from the control
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group, as it is widely accepted that they are quite different from other states in economic and geographic characteristics
(results remain robust to the inclusion of MSAs in these states). To further minimize the possibility of unobservable,
confounding variables, we provide two robustness checks focusing exclusively on treated (Florida) and control (non‐
Florida) MSAs that (a) have very similar industry composition and (b) are located near the Florida borderline.
In our difference‐in‐differences regressions, we consider an indicator variable that adopts a value of unity for years
following 1996 (Post). We interact this with an indicator variable that equals 1 for the MSAs in Florida (FL). To test the
heterogeneous effects by firm size, we split the sample into two groups: one for firms with no more than 50 employees
(“Small,” the first four size categories in the BDS data) and another for firms with more than 1,000 employees (“Large,”
the last four size categories in the BDS data, “Large”). We then run separate log‐linear regressions in Equation (1) for
the split samples for 1993–1999 (±3 years from the year of the amendment)5:
⋅ ⋅ ⋅Y α δ τ Post FL X βlog = + + + + ϵ ,′it i t t i it it (1)
where Yit is an outcome of interest, αi MSA fixed effect, δt year fixed effect, and X ′it matrix of covariates. Note that FLi
and Postt variables are absorbed by the MSA and year fixed effects. The treatment is the 1996 amendment to the Florida
statutes—that is stronger enforcement of non‐competes—and the parameter of interest is τ .
The difference‐in‐differences estimation in Equation (1) forces estimates to be the same within pre‐ or posttreatment
years. In Supporting Information Appendix G, we run a more flexible econometric model with distributed leads and
lags (“event study regression techniques”). We interact the treatment indicator with year indicators, rather than
uniformly assigning zero and unity for all pre‐ and posttreatment years.
An alternate approach compares the effects by firm size in the same model. Based on the 12 firm size categories
provided in the BDS data, we created four dummy variables for firm size by collapsing the 12 categories into four: SizeS
(1–19), SizeM (20–249), SizeL (250–2,500), and SizeXL (more than 2,500 employees).6 We then run the difference‐in‐
differences estimation in Equation (2) for the period ranging from 1993 to 1999 with full sample.
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅Y π Post FL SizeM π Post FL SizeL π Post FL SizeXL α δ X βlog = + + + + + + ϵ ,′ist M t i s L t i s XL t i s i t it ist (2)
where X ′it includes all relevant two‐way interactions ( ⋅FL Posti t, ⋅FL SizeMi s, ⋅FL SizeLi s, ⋅FL SizeXLi s, ⋅Post SizeMt s,
⋅Post SizeLt s, and ⋅Post SizeXLt s) and firm size dummies (SizeMs, SizeLs, and SizeXLs). Note that FLi and Postt variables are
absorbed by the MSA and year fixed effects. Size S is the omitted baseline and the parameters of interest are πM , πL, and πXL.
The data are yearly, and since the new law applied to the contracts written on and after July 1, 1996, the inclusion of
1996 in the sample might bias the estimates. In addition, since the amendment was introduced by the Florida legis-
lature, it is possible that employers and employees anticipated the change ex ante and adjusted their behavior before the
effective date, July 1, 1996 (Barnett & Sichelman, 2016). We, therefore, exclude 6 months before and after the effective
date and run the regressions in Equations (1, 3) and supplementary Equation (2) for 1993–1999, leaving out the year of
amendment, 1996.7
5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Business size and location preferences
Figure 2 compares the densities of a set outcomes in Florida by firm size between 1995 and 1997. The solid line
represents the density in 1995, while the dashed line represents the density in 1997 (left‐hand side y‐axis). Bars behind
the density lines show changes in density between 1995 and 1997 (right‐hand side y‐axis). In Panel (a) of Figure 2, the
entry of establishments (business units) of small firms (including small single‐unit firms) decreased in 1997, whereas
that of large firms increased. As might be expected due to the large number of establishments that do not move,
differences in density lines are less discernible for the total number of establishments in Panel (b). Changes in density
shown in bars, however, are consistent with the entry comparison. The decrease in establishments comes from small
firms, and the increase from large firms, following the amendment.
Figure 3 compares Florida to a counterfactual synthetic Florida. We use the Synthetic Control Method to construct a
control unit that approximates the characteristics of the treated unit Florida. This procedure compares a single treated
unit to a weighted average of all the other control units (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond, &
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Hainmueller, 2012). For the synthetic Florida (control), the weight of each state is chosen based only on the pre-
treatment period (1991–1995) trends for all the U.S. states except for Alaska, California, Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico.
More specifically, we calculated the weights based on our outcomes of interest in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 after
normalizing values relative to the 1994 value. An important advantage of normalizing the values is that we account for
the time‐invariant difference between Florida and other states, as in the formal difference‐in‐differences model. In
other words, we take it into account that MSAs have different absolute numbers of establishments and employment and
rely on relative changes over time. To construct a single, representative weight used for all our analyses with four
different outcomes of interest, we calculate the optimal weights for each of four outcomes of interest and then take the
arithmetic mean across the four weights for each state. With a single weight, we could construct a parallel trend for
Florida and its synthetic control for pretreatment periods in all four graphs in Figure 3. Individual weights and analyses
returned similar results.8
Since we study differential effects by firm size, we split the sample and plot the result by small versus large firms. In
Figure 3, the red solid line represents Florida, while the brown dashed line represents the counterfactual synthetic Florida.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIGURE 2 Density of establishments and employment of Florida firms by size: 1995 vs. 1997. (a) Establishment entry, (b)
establishments, (c) job creation, (d) employment. The solid and dashed lines represent the distribution (density) of each outcome by firm size
in Florida in 1995 and 1997, respectively. Gray bars represent the difference in density between 1995 and 1997. Source: Business Dynamics
Statistics, 1995 and 1997. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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We find in Panel (a) that the number of establishments of small firms in Florida becomes significantly lower than that in
synthetic control or counterfactual Florida, beginning from 1996. In contrast, the number of establishments of Large firms
shows the opposite trend in the short run: it becomes higher than counterfactual Florida in the following few years, although
the long‐term trend seems less clear. We generally find the opposite outcomes for establishments by small versus large firms.
Supporting Information Appendix E presents consistent results from a set of placebo treatments under the null hypothesis
that the law change had no effect and Appendix K documents additional split sample analyses that align pretreatment years.
Table 2 presents results from formal difference‐in‐differences models. Equation (1) estimates a split sample model.
As hypothesized, for establishment entry in Column (1), we consistently find opposite signs for FL Post× between the
small (<50 employees) and Large (>1,000 employees) split‐samples. Establishment entry by small firms decreases by
5.6%, whereas that of Large firms increased by 8.5%. The number of establishments in Column (2) shows a similar
pattern though the estimate from small sample is imprecisely estimated.
Table 3 shows the results from alternate models (with full sample) where we interact indicators for the four
collapsed firm size categories with FL Post× . For the establishment entry in Column (1), we consistently find that the
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 3 Synthetic control method: establishments and employment by firm size. (a) Establishments, small firms (<50), Large firms
(>1,000), (b) employment, small firms (<50), Large firms (>1,000). The outcome variables for Florida are normalized relative to their 1994
value. Data: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1991–2001. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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estimates are positive and large for bigger firms. Entry of establishments of firms with 20–249 workers (SizeM) is 3.7%
larger than that of firms with 1–19 workers (SizeS). Entry of establishments of firms with 250–2,500 (SizeL) and more
than 2,500 workers (SizeXL) is 15.3% and 12.4% larger than that of firms with 1–19 workers (SizeS), respectively.
Column (2) illustrates consistent results for the total number of establishments. The number of establishments of firms
with 250–2,500 (SizeL) and more than 2,500 workers (SizeXL) increased by 4% and 11% compared to that of firms with
1–19 workers (SizeS).
This approach estimates the effects for larger firms relative to the smallest firm size category, Size. To estimate the effects
more generally, we estimate separately for each firm size category with regression models in Equation (1). The results for the
TABLE 2 Effects of non‐competes on establishments and employment of Florida firms by size: Split samples
Dependent variables
Establishment entry Establishment Job creation Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Split sample: Small firms (#Employees < 50)
FL × Post –0.0562* –0.0033 –0.0183 –0.0048
(0.0101) (0.0062) (0.0074) (0.0060)
MSA F.E. Y Y Y Y
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,488 7,488 7,488 7,488
B. Split sample: Large firms (#Employees > 1,000)
FL × Post 0.0849* 0.0981* 0.0760* 0.1468*
(0.0154) (0.0073) (0.0187) (0.0121)
MSA F.E. Y Y Y Y
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,488 7,488 7,488 7,488
Note: the two panels show the results from small (panel A) and large (panel B) firm split samples. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are
presented in parentheses.
*p< .01.
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1993–1999.
TABLE 3 Effects of non‐competes on establishments and employment of Florida firms by size: Interaction
Dependent variables
Establishment entry Establishment Job creation Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FL × Post –0.0541* –0.0011 –0.0273* –0.0047
(0.0105) (0.0060) (0.0073) (0.0058)
FL × Post × Size M (20–249) 0.0372* –0.0014 0.0241* –0.0018
(0.0131) (0.0039) (0.0084) (0.0039)
FL × Post × Size L (250–2,500) 0.1526* 0.0397* 0.2357* 0.1277*
(0.0140) (0.0086) (0.0210) (0.0095)
FL × Post × Size XL (2,500+) 0.1236* 0.1079* 0.0832* 0.1580*
(0.0181) (0.0066) (0.0200) (0.0123)
MSA F.E. Y Y Y Y
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y
Observations 22,464 22,464 22,464 22,464
Note: This table shows the results from full sample. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses.
*p< .01.
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1993–1999.
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number of establishments by firm size are summarized in Panel (a) of Figure 4, where each dot represents an estimate for
FL Post× from four separate regressions for each firm size category: SizeS, SizeM , SizeL, and SizeXL. This result suggests
that the effects primarily come from responses by large firms, as their magnitude of effects are much larger and more
precisely estimated. Large firms prefer to (re)locate in regions that strongly enforce non‐competes.
Small firm (less than 19 employees) entry appears to weaken after 1996. Table 2, column 1, shows a 5.6% decrease in
the entry of small firms or their establishments. An alternative, full‐sample specification with the four firm size
categories, shown in Table 3, produces the similar result that the entry of establishments with less than 20 workers
(SizeM) decreased by 5.4%. Appendix F illustrates consistent results using more granular estimations with all
12 categories. If one accepts that firms with less than 19 employees are more likely to be entrepreneurial (see
Starr, 2019), the change in non‐compete law appears to have made Florida a more attractive location for large firms and
a less attractive location for entrepreneurs.
5.2 | Business size, job creation, and employment
Panel (c) of Figure 2 illustrates job creation by size of firm in Florida between 1995 and 1997. Job creation by the four
smallest (<50 employees) and two largest (>5,000) categories decreased and increased, respectively, while the results in
the middle of the distribution are mixed. Employment in Panel (d) of Figure 2 shows a similar pattern. Employment in
the six smallest categories consistently decreased, whereas that of the two largest categories significantly increased.
Figure K.1 in Supporting Information Appendix K splits the data between small (<50 workers) and large firms (>1,000
workers) within Florida. In Panel (b), employment in small firms (dashed line) decreased, as opposed to that in large
firms (solid line), following the 1996 amendment. Finally, an inter‐state comparison with the Synthetic Control in Panel
(b) of Figure 3 shows consistent results. Both figures in Panel (b) show a parallel trend for preamendment years,
1991–1995, satisfying the rationale behind this approach. We find decreased employment by small firms in the left‐hand
side, relative to a weighted average of other control states, beginning from the amendment year. In contrast, increased
employment by large firms is found in the right‐hand side, relative to the synthetic control.
Table 2 estimates split sample models from Equation (1) and illustrates that Small firms decreased their job creation by
1.8%, whereas Large firms increased by 7.6%, though the estimate for the Small firm sample remains imprecise. The
alternative specification with the full sample and four categories for size, shown in Column (3)–(4), Table 3, finds consistent
results. Large firms that have more than 250 workers (SizeL and SizeXL) increased their job creation and employment by
(a) (b)
FIGURE 4 Establishments and employment of Florida firms by size: split‐sample regressions. Each point stands for an estimate
(Post FL× ) from separate regressions by firm size category. The vertical lines stand for 95% confidence internal based on standard errors
clustered at the state level. Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1993–1999. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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8–24% and 13–16%, respectively, compared to small firms that have 1–19 workers (SizeS). The results from separate
estimations for four firm size categories are summarized in Figure 4b. Each dot represents an estimate for Post FL× , and we
again find that the effects primarily come from hiring expansions by large firms (rather than shrinking employment by small
firms). More granular interactions in Supporting Information Appendix F find consistent results for smaller firms.
The change in non‐compete law appears to have altered job creation and employment by small and large firms in
opposite ways. The the total number of jobs in Florida clearly increased after the amendment was instituted, and these
jobs predominantly came from large firms; small firms created relatively fewer jobs.
5.3 | Regional business concentration
The first two results imply an increase in business concentration for two reasons. First, large firms appeared to prefer a
region that enforces non‐competes when they launch or relocate establishments; small firms appeared to be relatively
crowded out. Second, large firms appear to be adding jobs and growing at a faster rate than small firms.
Although we do not have firm‐level data that covers both small and large firms, we can estimate changes in business
concentration using the following three measures: (a) share of establishments that belong to large firms (“establishment
concentration”), (b) share of workers that belong to large firms (“employment concentration”), and (c) a Pseudo
Herfindahl‐Herschman Index (HHI). Note that this Pseudo‐HHI measure also uses the share of employees. It is
calculated based on the weighted average of the share of employees in each firm size category in each MSA:
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥∑ ∑PseudoHHI
Min Max Number of Employees
Number of Employees
= +
2
× ,it
s
s s ist
s ist=1
12 2
where Min Max+
2
s s is the representative firm size in each firm size category s (“weight”), and ∑
Number of Employees
Number of Employees
ist
s ist
is the
share of employees in size category s in MSA i in year t (“share”). It then requires the square root of the sum over all 12
categories.9 This measure mimics calculations for the product market share‐based HHI and captures the degree of
business concentration at the MSA‐year level.
Figure 5 shows the results from the Synthetic Control Method. In both Panel (a) and Panel (b), we consistently find that
business concentration increases after the year of law change, 1996. We then run the differences‐in‐difference regression in
Equation (3) with the three different measures of business concentration. We do not take the logarithm on the dependent
variable because the outcomes of interest are bound ( ∈shares [0,1], ∈PseudoHHI [0,122.5]) and close to the Normal
distribution:
⋅ ⋅Y α δ τ Post FL ϵ= + + + .it i t t i it (3)
In our result in Column (1) in Table 4, we find that the establishment concentration increased by 0.0036 points or about
2.82% (the establishment concentration in Florida was on average 0.1278 before the 1996 law change). Column (2) shows the
employment concentration. Consistent with our prediction, the results show an increase by 0.0209 points or 5.15% (the
employment concentration in Florida was on average 0.406 before the 1996 law change). Column (3) again illustrates that
business concentration measured by the Pseudo‐HHI increases after stronger non‐compete enforcement, by 1.45 points or
4.41% (the Pseudo‐HHI in Florida was on average 32.90 before the 1996 law change). In Supporting Information Appendix G,
we additionally run a more flexible econometric model with distributed leads and lags (“event study techniques”) and conduct
robustness checks with industry paired sample and state‐bordering MSAs, all of which produce similar results. In summary,
the change in non‐compete law appears to have preceded increased business concentration, arguably through different firm
(re)location choices by size of firm and relatively faster employment growth by larger firms.
6 | POTENTIAL THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION
Since we investigate a single event that happened at the state‐level to identify the effects, the results remain vulnerable to other
simultaneous and confounding events, particularly if there was a change that operated in the same direction as the
14 | KANG AND FLEMING
non‐compete amendment. While it is not possible to consider every event that happened in 1996, we discuss two potential
threats to identification: Enterprise Florida, Inc. and electoral changes. Furthermore, in the Supporting Information Appendix
C, we also establish that wage trends changed little before and after 1996. This eases concern that the law change impacted the
economy through wage changes and that the effects of non‐competes were absorbed in wage adjustments.
6.1 | Enterprise Florida, Inc.
Enterprise Florida, Inc. (EFI) is a “public‐private partnership between Florida's business and government leaders,”
aiming to “expand and diversify the state's economy through job creation.” When describing their history, EFI states,
(a) (b)
FIGURE 5 Synthetic Control method: business concentration. The outcome variables are normalized relative to their 1994 value.
We measure “establishment (or business‐unit) concentration” as the share of establishments by large firms (that have more than 1,000
employees) and “employment concentration” as the share of employment by Large firms.Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1991–2001.
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 4 Effects of non‐competes on regional business concentration
Dependent variables
Establishment concentration Employment concentration Pseudo HHI
(1) (2) (3)
FL × Post 0.0036* 0.0209* 1.4514*
(0.0006) (0.0017) (0.2369)
MSA F.E. Y Y Y
Year F.E. Y Y Y
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872
Note: This tables shows the results from linear regressions with full sample (dependent variables not logarithmized). We measure “establishment (or business‐
unit) concentration” as the share of establishments by Large firms (∈[0,1]) and “employment concentration” as the share of employment by Large firms
(∈[0,1]). Large firms are defined as firms that have more than 1,000 employees. The maximum possible value of Pseudo‐HHI is 122.5 (and the minimum is 0).
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses.
*p< .01.
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1993–1999.
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“In 1996, under Governor Lawton Chiles, Florida became the first state in the country to place principal responsibility
for economic development, international trade, research and business image marketing in the hands of a public‐private
partnership.” If EFI began a program in 1996 that (a) could affect Florida businesses and (b) disproportionately favored
large established firms, there would be potential confounds. However, we do not find any evidence that EFI actively
initiated any programs around 1996 or that its policies favored large firms, at the expense of small firms.
First, according to the EFI's history statement, it was not until 2011 that the EFI created a, “seamless economic
development team,” and began publishing annual reports and assessments. Archival research did not find any evidence
of its activities in the 1990s. Furthermore, the EFI states that it focused on reforming the state's industry structure from
tourism and agriculture to a more sophisticated mix. Figure H.1 in Supporting Information Appendix H reveals no
noticeable change in Florida's industry composition for 1991–2001, indicating minimal if any influence from EFI
activities in the 1990s. Second, even if the EFI had actively operated beginning from 1996, its website stated that EFI “…
supports small and minority businesses through its capital programs” and other entrepreneurial goals.
6.2 | Electoral changes
If electoral outcomes changed sharply around 1996 in preference for pro‐big business candidates, the findings might
result from other policies that favored large firms. We do not, however, see a discontinuous change in Florida party
politics at this time. First, incumbent Republican U.S. Senator Connie Mack III won re‐election to a second term in
1994. Second, in 1992, President Bill Clinton (Democratic) won over Senator Bob Dole (Republican) by a margin of
5.7%. This represented an improvement over his narrow loss of the state in 1992.10 Lastly, in 1996, in the 23 districts in
Florida, 20 incumbents were re‐elected. The remaining three incumbents retired, and candidates from the same party
kept the districts. In summary, it does not appear that electoral outcomes would disproportionately some firms over
others in Florida around 1996.
7 | ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
7.1 | Matching MSAs on industry composition
Although enforcement of non‐competes typically applies equally to all industries, adoption and implementation (by
employers and employees) could still differ. Starr, Prescott, and Bishara (2019) in fact find in their 2014 survey that the
use of non‐compete varies across states and industries; for example, they find few incidences of non‐competes in
agriculture and hunting (9%), compared to information (32%), mining and extraction (31%), and professional and
scientific (31%) industries. Here we test if our results remain robust to industry control across MSAs.
We are not able to control directly for industry composition because the BDS data lack information by industry. As
an alternative, we look at the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data that provide information on
county, MSA, and state‐level industry composition. Figure H.1 in Supporting Information Appendix H shows Florida's
industry composition from 1991 to 2001. The idea is that, using industry information in the QCEW, we can control for
conflating effects of industry composition by pairing MSAs of Florida with control states that share the similar industry
composition. We then use these treatment‐control MSA pairs in the BDS data and rerun the regressions.
We use employment in five‐digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) sector (11111‐99999) in
each MSA to calculate the Euclidean distance between industry compositions of any two MSAs
∑Industry Distance Emp Emp= ( − ) ,A B
NAICS digit
A NAICS B NAICS,
(5− )
, ,
2
where EmpA NAICS, and EmpB NAICS, are the employment by industry NAICS in MSA A and B, respectively. For each
Florida MSA, we identify ten non‐Florida MSAs that have the most similar industry structure as the focal Florida MSA
(i.e., that have the lowest industry distance). We then run the same difference‐in‐differences estimation using the paired
MSA data. Results provided in Tables 5 and 6 (odd‐numbered columns) and Supporting Information Appendix Table
G.1. in are qualitatively similar to our main findings, making it less likely that the results are driven by a discrepancy in
industry composition between the treated and control MSAs.
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TABLE 5 Effects of non‐competes on establishments and employment of Florida firms by size: Split samples (border and matching)
Dependent variables
Establishment entry Establishment Job creation Employment
Matching Border Matching Border Matching Border Matching Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Split sample: Small firms (#Employees < 50)
FL × Post –0.0506*** –0.0022 –0.0161 –0.0058 –0.0315*** –0.0341 –0.0180* –0.0287**
(0.0178) (0.0169) (0.0106) (0.0139) (0.0114) (0.0519) (0.0109) (0.0159)
MSA F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,248 168 1,248 168 1,248 168 1,248 168
B. Split sample: Large firms (#Employees > 1,000)
FL × Post 0.1368*** 0.2439*** 0.1168*** 0.1622*** 0.0847** 0.2658 0.169*** 0.0969***
(0.0328) (0.0781) (0.0188) (0.0263) (0.0376) (0.2007) (0.0400) (0.0445)
MSA F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,248 168 1,248 168 1,248 168 1,248 168
Note: The two panels show the results from small (panel A) and large (panel B) firm with split samples. For each Florida MSA, we paired 10 non‐Florida MSAs
that have the most similar industry composition. The results are presented in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7). Only borderline MSAs are included in columns (2),
(4), (6), and (8). Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses.
*p< .1.
**p< .05.
***p< .01.
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1993–1999.
TABLE 6 Effects of non‐competes on establishments and employment of Florida firms by size: interaction (border and matching)
Dependent variables
Establishment entry Establishment Job creation Employment
Matching Border Matching Border Matching Border Matching Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FL × Post –0.0396 –0.0292 –0.0131 –0.0082 –0.0328 –0.0437** –0.0166 –0.0209**
(0.0171) (0.0340) (0.0103) (0.0202) (0.0119) (0.0202) (0.0097) (0.0035)
FL × Post × Size M (20–249) 0.0561 0.0611** 0.0040 0.0181 0.0345** 0.0188* –0.0016 –0.0434**
(0.0369) (0.0095) (0.0103) (0.0555) (0.0139) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0161)
FL × Post × Size L (250–2,500) 0.1521** 0.0672 0.0325** 0.1450** 0.1638** –0.0926 0.1181** –0.1268
(0.0383) (0.0417) (0.0137) (0.0296) (0.0413) (0.3020) (0.0295) (0.0890)
FL × Post × Size XL (2,500+) 0.1669** 0.3211* 0.1355** 0.1169** 0.1091** 0.4576** 0.1911** 0.2645**
(0.0278) (0.1835) (0.0136) (0.0079) (0.0349) (0.0638) (0.0334) (0.0691)
MSA F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,744 504 3,744 504 3,744 504 3,744 504
Note: This tables shows the results from log‐linear regressions with full sample. For each Florida MSA, we paired 10 non‐Florida MSAs that have the most
similar industry composition. The results are presented in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7). Only borderline MSAs are included in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8).
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses.
*p< .05.
**p< .01.
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, 1993–1999.
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7.2 | State‐bordering MSAs
Unobservable characteristics might still differ between the treatment group (MSAs in Florida) and control group (MSAs
in states other than Florida). To mitigate this concern, we restrict our sample to MSAs that adjoin the Florida border or
that are located within 50 miles from the border. It is expected that the MSAs near the Florida borderline would share
many unobservable characteristics, further ensuring the validity of the control group and the parallel trend assumption.
MSAs in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia near the border of Florida are identified in Supporting Information
Appendix Figure I.1. There are four MSAs in Florida, two in Alabama, and one in Georgia. Thanks to geographic
proximity and an arbitrary straight border, these MSAs should share many unobservable or intangible characteristics
such as commutable area, culture, weather, and so forth. The results of the formal regression, Equations (1) and
supplementary Equation (2), are presented in Tables 5 and 6 (even‐numbered columns). The results are not qualita-
tively different from those in Tables 2 and 3 (and industry matching results in odd‐numbered columns in Tables 5
and 6), though with a much smaller number of observations, the estimates become less precise.
The magnitudes are generally larger in the models with only border MSAs. One potential explanation for this result (which
could only be tested with establishment‐level panel data) is a substitution effect arising in the borderline sample. Given the
geographic proximity and cultural similarity between the treated and the control in the borderline, the closer a firm is to
Florida, the more likely that this particular firm (re)locates to Florida, in direct response to the 1996 Florida amendment. For
example, it is much more likely that potential new entrants choose between Tallahassee MSA (Florida) versus Valdosta MSA
(Georgia) than Tallahassee MSA (Florida) versus San Francisco MSA (California). The borderline sample captures this
substitution effect to a greater extent than the full sample. In other words, a move between state‐bordering MSAs will more
likely lead to double‐counting of the effect when a large firm moves into Florida and a small firm leaves, because a move of
single establishment (or employee) from control MSA to treatment MSA is counted twice when we calculate the difference in
the number of establishments (or employees) between the two groups.
This argument implies that our control MSAs from Alabama and Georgia borders are also affected by the 1996
Florida amendment. This magnified result for state‐bordering MSAs increases our confidence that firms make (re)
location and employment decisions in response to changes in non‐compete enforceability. We find greater effects even
if the two MSAs share most a similar business environment other than legal institutions that govern non‐compete
enforcement, strengthening the probability that the changes in the enforceability may be the only reason for increased
(re)location of businesses or employment after the 1996 Florida amendment.
8 | DISCUSSION
This study shares limitations with existing studies on non‐competes in that the variation in the legal regime we exploit
occurs at the state level (most policy or legislative changes on non‐competes occur, at a minimum, at the state level).
Nor can we observe individual labor contracts (i.e., whether each employee signed a non‐compete or not). The stark
change in non‐compete enforcement makes Florida a good research site, however, and our additional analyses on the
industry‐matched MSAs and Florida borderline should lessen these concerns. While we investigated other states’
changes in non‐compete laws, none offered the sharp and focused change of Florida's 1996 statute, and most experi-
enced only a weak and/or ambiguous change in enforcement or were vulnerable to other confounding factors.
The search for additional research sites revealed a great deal of heterogeneity in the details of each law change and
local context, heterogeneity which makes it fundamentally difficult to generalize the impact of different changes in non‐
compete laws across different states. The research consistently implied that Florida was strong and unique (in parti-
cular, the flip in presumption of injury and burden of proof); indeed, the Garmaise scale took Florida from a moderately
enforcing state to the most extreme non‐compete regime in the country. In characterizing Florida and other non‐
compete law changes, it became clear that no state completely flipped from one regime to the other, instead, most
changes have been more subtle differences of degree and types of enforcement mechanisms. It should also be noted that
the stronger versus weaker enforcement may not necessarily have symmetric effects. This calls into question the
assumption that every state's change in non‐competes—in either direction—can be used as binary and opposite ex-
periments. Researchers cannot unfortunately bin all changes in non‐compete laws into two discrete buckets and then
estimate aggregated models.
Following our own recommendations then, we present Florida as a single case study. Florida's experience implies
that enforcement of non‐competes could crowd out small firms, favor large firms, and thereby increase regional
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business concentration. The best evidence for generalization comes not from Florida but from Figure 1, where we found
state‐level correlations between non‐compete enforceability and the outcomes of interest. The left panels in Figure 1
show that states which strongly enforce non‐competes tend to have a smaller proportion of small firm establishments
and employment. The right panels in Figure 1 reflect this result for larger firms; stronger non‐compete enforceability
and the proportion of large firm establishments and employment are positively correlated. The sharp contrast between
small versus large firms’ cross‐sectional correlations are consistent with the illustrated mechanisms in Florida. Panel (c)
in Figure 1 then illustrates a positive relationship between a state's strength of enforcement and its business con-
centration as measured by a Pseudo HHI. These relationships hold consistently for two indices of enforceability
(Garmaise, 2009; Starr, 2019) and without the outliers of California and North Dakota (see Supporting Information
Appendix J, for more detail).
Analogous to the brain drain of talented individuals from non‐competes (Marx et al., 2015), these results could be
also labeled as a small—and probably entrepreneurial—firm drain (though Florida obviously benefited from the
location choices and increased employment of large firms). If the human and organizational capital of small firms
leaves states that enforce non‐competes for states that do not, it is less surprising that California and other non‐
enforcing states have become hotbeds of entrepreneurship (Guzman & Stern, 2015). For example, Facebook moved
when still small from an enforcing state (Massachusetts) to a non‐enforcing state (California). Is such movement an
anomaly or characteristic of more promising small firms? Possibly reflecting this effect, Marx and Fleming (2012)
illustrated that the proportion of elite inventors—as measured by career prior art citations and number of co‐authors—
have become increasingly likely to emigrate to states that do not enforce non‐competes. Fallick, Fleischman, and
Rebitzer (2006) also suggest that weaker enforcement of non‐competes is positively correlated with “the reallocation of
talent and resources towards firms with superior innovations.”Weighed against the downsides of entrepreneurial brain
drain is that large firms tend to do better than smaller ones (Hathaway & Litan, 2014) and our finding demonstrated
here that more jobs were created in Florida immediately following the strengthening of non‐compete enforcement.
9 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
Most research on non‐competes has examined individual outcomes on mobility, other has considered entrepreneurship
and innovation, and very little has considered how firms respond to changes in or types of non‐compete regimes. Here
we examined how the stronger enforcement of non‐competes differentially influenced small versus large firms and
consequently business dynamism in one local economy, using the 1996 amendment to Florida statutes on non‐
competes. The results contribute to the literature by exploring the heterogeneous effects of non‐competes by firm size
on firm location choice, employment growth, and business concentration. The enforcement of non‐competes appears to
have affected not only spatial (re)location of businesses and workers across states but also endogenous growth within
states by firm size. Small, entrepreneurial firms and large incumbent firms responded to non‐compete enforceability in
opposing ways. Large firms appeared more likely to locate (either launch or move) their establishments in Florida, and
small firms appeared less likely. Although our data could not isolate specific mechanisms or differentiate between new
versus existing firms, small firms appeared reluctant or less able to create new jobs. In contrast, large firms boosted their
rate of new job creation and the level of employment, following the law change. Consistent with these results, we
observed an increase in the business concentration in Florida, following strengthened non‐compete enforcement.
Furthermore, across all the U.S. states, we observe a negative cross‐sectional correlation between non‐compete
enforcement and small firms’ establishment and employment. In consistent contrast, a positive (negative) relationship
exists between non‐compete enforcement and large (small) firms’ establishment and employment. Business con-
centrations also exhibit positive relationships with non‐compete enforcement across all the U.S. states.
While intending to address leakage and lack of investment, the enforcement of non‐competes creates complications
and, in practice, the optimal degree and nuance of their application remains unclear. It is difficult to monitor ob-
servance of the agreement and contract on every possible contingency. Non‐competes affect the labor market and can
create inefficiency, as prior employees cannot utilize their expertise and experience in the same field for a certain
amount of time. Employers can potentially increase their leverage over employees because employees have fewer
outside options and less bargaining power under a non‐compete. Employees often do not understand the legal nuances
of labor law and their chances of prevailing, should they face prosecution by their former employer. This confusion can
create a chilling effect on worker mobility, as employees are reluctant to incur potentially debilitating personal expenses
for an uncertain legal outcome (Marx, 2011). By restricting mobility, non‐competes can make it more difficult for firms
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to hire the talent they need, slow the optimal matching of human capital and opportunities (Jackson, 2013), and
potentially retard the diffusion of knowledge and expertise (Belenzon & Schankerman, 2013; Fallick et al., 2006).
While most research on non‐competes has to date focused on individuals and entrepreneurship, the differential
effects on firm (re‐)location and employment by firm size and consequent regional business concentration have
received little attention, despite having important managerial and policy implications. Firm strategies for R&D and
innovation differ by their size (e.g., Cohen & Klepper, 1996a, 1996b), and thus it is important for managers to
understand how small and large firms (re)locate and grow differently in response to non‐compete enforcement.
Managers need to be aware that non‐compete enforcement may affect not only the mobility of its own workers but also
competition and the broader market environment, most importantly, through the redistribution of firm size and
increased concentration. Stronger enforcement may attract and favor large established firms, while lowering the birth
and/or move‐in rate and growth of small entrepreneurial firms. Non‐competes impact many firm decisions, not only in
location choice and hiring and competing in a less mobile labor market, but also in choices for growth, product
development, alliance partners or acquisition targets, supply chain design, and competitive strategy. All of these choices
directly influence ultimate performance.
Furthermore, to the extent that small and large firms provide different values and jobs to local economies (e.g.,
incremental versus break‐through innovations, the quantity and quality and types of jobs, application of productivity
enhancing innovations), the effects of non‐competes on a local economy could be varied and large. Asymmetries in firm
positioning and employment growth (i.e., the dominance of large firms and the jobs they offer) could have important
implications for welfare for consumers and producers. For instance, if new jobs at start‐ups create unique value for
firms and the economy that cannot be provided by already mature firms (e.g., if startups are more likely to incorporate
productivity enhancing innovations), state governments may want to attract entrepreneurs and the jobs they create.
Geographic agglomeration and clustering of different sizes of firms also have important implications for en-
trepreneurship, innovation, intellectual property protection, and regional economic growth (The White House, 2016).
In this sense, policies and legal constraints on non‐competes should not be considered in isolation.
Non‐competes are not mere contractual provisions agreed upon by employees and employers; they have wider
implications for consumers, social welfare, inter‐state competition in attracting businesses, intra‐state competition for
labor forces, endogenous business growth, and business dynamism. Policy makers and legislators should take these
broader impacts into account.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (Grant 1735650), the Kauffman
Foundation, the Haas School of Business, and the Coleman Fung Institute for Engineering Leadership. We thank
conference participants at the 2016 Strategic Management Society Special Conference, the 2017 Academy of Man-
agement Meeting, the 2017 Roundtable for Engineering Entrepreneurship Research, the Tenth Annual Conference on
Innovation Economics, the 2017 Vienna Conference on Strategy, Organizational Design, and Innovation, and the
Fourth International ZEW Conference on the Dynamics of Entrepreneurship. We also thank Sam Arts, Jim Bessen,
Sampsa Samila, Olav Sorenson, Evan Starr, and Wes Cohen for their comments and feedback. Errors and omissions
remain with the authors.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
All data are from public sources.
ENDNOTES
1 Garmaise (2009) selected a random sample of 500 firms from the Execcomp database (1992–2004). This is only a lower bound because
firms are not required to disclose this information.
2 Amazon removed non‐competes after intense media coverage and controversy in 2015.
3 Please see the Supporting Information Appendices A and B, for full text of §542.33B and §542.335 and further discussion on why the post‐
1996 legal regime offers much more leniency to employers seeking non‐compete enforcement. The Supporting Information Appendices
also provide a summary of other state changes in non‐compete enforceability and highlight their unsuitability for use as additional
research sites. First, and in many cases, legislative amendments include changes that would confound the analysis. For example, the
intent of the 1986 change in Michigan law (MARA, 1986) was to increase competition. This is particularly important in a study that
examines business concentration as an outcome. Second, some changes were only applicable to a limited set of agents in the economy.
For example, Utah in 2018 modified the law to limit the enforcement of non‐competes against employees in the broadcasting industry who
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make less than $47,476 per year. The 2001 Louisiana change provided an asymmetric incentive for economic agents in a sense that they
only regulated job moves between employers; employees bound by non‐competes could still start their own businesses. Third, many are
weak and marginal changes. Some states merely changed their restrictions on choice‐of‐law provisions or the timing of notice. In some
cases, it is not even clear what the direction of change might have been, for example, Florida's 1990 change. Fourth, multiple changes
sometimes occurred within a small window of time, making it difficult to compare pre‐ and post‐change outcomes. Examples include
Louisiana changes (2001 and 2003) and Idaho changes (2016 and 2018) and Utah changes (2016 and 2018). Finally, data are not available
for most recent changes. For all of these reasons, we present Florida as essentially a single case study that illustrates one potential path
from non‐competes to business concentration; further work remains to establish a wider validity of that path.
4 The literature provides varying definitions of “market concentration” or “industry concentration.” In some cases, researchers use market
concentration to refer to product sales concentration, and define industry concentration by firm within SIC or NAICS categories. To avoid
confusion, we use the term “(regional) business concentration” that consists of the following three measures: “establishment (or business‐
unit) concentration” when looking at the share of establishments by large firms, “employment concentration” when looking at the share
of employment by large firms, and Pseudo HHI (as defined in Section 5.3).
5 A variation of the window that is ±2, 3, or 5 years does not qualitatively change the result.
6 This approach is based on our understanding that the effects do not change linearly as a function of firm size (as in Figure 1). We ran the
linear interaction approach (where the size variable takes values from one to 12) nonetheless and found consistent results. In addition,
creating 12 dummy variables (rather than three) produces the qualitatively same results. See Supporting Information Appendix F for a
more detailed description and results.
7 The results are robust to the inclusion of 1996 as treatment year.
8 Here we make a stringent assumption that our dependent variables are closely interconnected and use a single representative weight to
construct the counterfactual Florida for all outcomes of interest. However, it is possible that the drivers for our outcomes are different; for
example, states that show a similar trend in small establishment entry to that of Florida do not necessarily coincide with the states that
show a similar trend in large employment growth to that of Florida. We thus conducted the same analysis with different weights for each
of our dependent variables. This approach, by design, produces better parallel trends for pre‐1996 period, and the results are very similar
to those with a single weight.
9 The last firm size category is “10,000 or more employees.” For this category, we conservatively assume that the maximum number of
employees is 20,000, and the resulting Pseudo‐HHI measure ranges from 0 to 122.5. The result is robust to a wide range of alternative
assumptions.
10 This assumes that pro‐big business policies are most likely to be adopted by Republicans.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A.1 The 1996 amendment to the Florida statutes and non‐competes enforceability
§542.33B §542.335
(1990–Jun 1996) (July 1996–Present) Note
Protection of business
interests
Not specified Lists five nonexclusive legitimate
business interests that can be
protected
Provides an open‐ended
enumeration of what the
employers can do (but not what
they cannot do)
The modification of
over‐broad covenants
(“Blue pencil”)
Courts have option either to
modify or not to enforce
Courts can only modify the excessive
restraints rather than declaring it
non‐enforceable
Made it easier for employers to write
highly restrictive covenants
(without fearing it being
overturned)
Burden of proof Not specified Once an employer proves that the
non‐competes meet the “legitimate
business interests” restriction, the
burden of proof shifts to employee
§542.335(1)(c): “the person
opposing enforcement has the
burden of establishing that the
restraint is over‐broad, overlong,
or otherwise not reasonably
necessary …”
Injunctions and the
presumption of
irreparable injury
Not specified Once an employer shows the
intentional breach of non‐
competes, irreparable harm is
presumed.
Made it easier for employers to
receive injunctions. Courts may
also award damages for a
violation of non‐competes,
including lost profits and
damages
Courts may issue an injunction that
prohibits competition not only by
the former employee, but also by
his/her new employer
Limitations on public
policy defense
Allows the courts to
consider public policy
and welfare (when
entering injunction)
Courts could not refuse enforcement
on the grounds that it violated
public policy, with few exceptions
Sharply limited the use of the
“contrary to public policy”
defense against the enforcement
of non‐competes
Consideration of
individual economic
hardship
Not specified Not allowed to consider an employee's
individual hardship
An interpretation
favoring business
protection
Not specified Required to construe covenants “in
favor of providing reasonable
protection to all legitimate
business interests established by
the person seeking enforcement”
Not allowed to construe the
covenant narrowly against the
drafter or against enforcement
Enforcement despite the
discontinuation of
business
Not specified An employee has to prove that the
discontinuation had nothing to do
with his or her work for the
competitor
Award of attorney's fees Not specified Allowed for the awarding of attorney's
fees and costs to the prevailing
party
Imposed asymmetric burden to an
employee
Source: The authors’ assessment of the statutes.
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